The legal surrealism of George Herriman\u27s Krazy Kat by Dahlman, Ian
Law Text Culture 
Volume 16 Justice Framed: Law in Comics and 
Graphic Novels Article 4 
2012 
The legal surrealism of George Herriman's Krazy Kat 
Ian Dahlman 
McGill University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc 
Recommended Citation 
Dahlman, Ian, The legal surrealism of George Herriman's Krazy Kat, Law Text Culture, 16, 2012, 
35-64. 
Available at:https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol16/iss1/4 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
The legal surrealism of George Herriman's Krazy Kat 
Abstract 
In 1947, three years after George Herriman’s death ended Krazy Kat’s thirty-one year run, the prominent 
legal realist and theorist Karl Llewellyn published a brief but effervescent review of a Krazy Kat collection 
in the Columbia Law Review. The page count of the new collection was playfully listed as ‘unnumbered; 
many, but not enough’ (Llewellyn 1947: 337), subtly indicating that neither the review, nor the material it 
addressed was typical law journal fodder. In that era, it was rare for the world of comics and mass culture 
to surface in the annals of a law review. The article’s placement between one review of a book on cartel 
agreements and another review of a report on the Permanent Court of International Justice’s future only 
amplified the uncanniness of the two-page piece. 
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol16/iss1/4 
35Law Text Culture Vol 16 2012 00




Introduction – Karl Llewellyn’s Dangling Review
No lawyer should leave this gathering of Herriman’s ‘comics’ 
unstudied. I mean unstudied ... this is a book which men of the law 
need to work over not a single time for amusement, but many times, 
for study.
Karl Llewellyn ‘Review: Krazy Kat ’(1947: 338).
In 1947, three years after George Herriman’s death ended Krazy Kat ’s 
thirty-one year run, the prominent legal realist and theorist Karl 
Llewellyn published a brief but effervescent review of a Krazy Kat 
collection in the Columbia Law Review. The page count of the new 
collection was playfully listed as ‘unnumbered; many, but not enough’ 
(Llewellyn 1947: 337), subtly indicating that neither the review, nor 
the material it addressed was typical law journal fodder. In that era, 
it was rare for the world of comics and mass culture to surface in the 
annals of a law review. The article’s placement between one review 
of a book on cartel agreements and another review of a report on the 
Permanent Court of International Justice’s future only amplified the 
uncanniness of the two-page piece.
Llewellyn begins his review in grand measures, elevating Herriman to 
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the milieu of Honoré Daumier, William Hogarth, and Charles Dickens 
as an artist who both understood the vital place law held within humanity 
and communicated it with ‘bite’ – in other words, with power, weight, and 
effect – giving Krazy Kat an artistic import of historical scale. The review 
then proceeds to Kray Kat’s three main characters. First, Llewellyn gives 
effusive praise for the strip’s embodiment of law and order, Offissa Pupp: 
‘Never before in history, before Herriman’s Offissa Pup [sic], has an artist 
done, for lawyer and for layman, the true essence of our job, for all of us to 
see together’ (1947: 337). For Llewellyn, Offissa Pupp demonstrates that 
the law must both love its public and act preventively in its guard. Next, 
Llewellyn considers Krazy Kat him or herself (Herriman intentionally 
left Krazy’s gender indeterminate, although for the purposes of this article 
I will refer to Krazy as ‘her’).2 Llewellyn finds Krazy to be both of this 
world and transcending it, a living saint (1947: 338). Finally, Ignatz Mouse 
is painted as a beloved incarnation of ‘Rugged Individualism ... and the 
prey of two plain facts’ (1947: 338): one, that criminals inevitably reduce 
themselves to a singular method or ‘line’ of crime under the conditions 
of order; and two, that love is an undeniable and essential part of all 
‘right’ law and justice. Then suddenly, with a caveat that Krazy Kat is a 
collection ‘which men of the law need to work over not a single time for 
amusement, but many times, for study’ (1947: 338), Llewellyn is finished, 
and the law’s attention to Krazy Kat evaporated entirely.
Llewellyn’s review was hardly the first instance of an intellectual 
waxing poetic about Krazy Kat, but it is remarkable that Llewellyn is as 
equally absent from the regularly cited list of Krazy Kat intelligentsia fans 
as Krazy Kat is absent from the many works considering Llewellyn’s legal 
theories and contributions. Most pieces about the comic inevitably mention 
Gilbert Seldes’ The Seven Lively Arts of 1924, wherein Seldes lauded 
Krazy Kat as ‘the most amusing and fantastic and satisfactory work of art 
produced in America today’ (1924: 15). Seldes’ comments are part of the 
book’s broader claim that the so-called low arts of mass culture deserved 
as much critical attention, recognition, and respect as the self-proclaimed 
high arts. The edition of Krazy Kat that Llewellyn reviewed included 
a forward by E. E. Cummings (1946) which highlighted Herriman’s 
themes of democracy, individualism, and love. Many literary and artistic 
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giants such as F. Scott Fitzgerald, James Joyce, H. L. Mencken, Ernest 
Hemmingway, Pablo Picasso, Frank Capra, William de Kooning and Jack 
Kerouac were all public admirers of the strip (McDonnell et al 1986, Boxer 
2007), prompting Irving Howe to label Krazy Kat ‘the one comic strip 
intellectuals admitted to liking’ (1948: 49). Perhaps it should be expected 
that Llewellyn would be unmentioned in the significant discourse and 
writing surrounding Krazy Kat; in the struggle to gain symbolic capital 
for the comic medium (in which The Seven Lively Arts played an integral 
part), it was by reference to the opinions of the holders of cultural capital, 
such as avant-garde artists and writers, that valourisation of the medium 
could be achieved.  A scholar of jurisprudence simply lacks the same 
cultural weight, even if he also happens to be a poet.3
Despite Llewellyn’s clear influence and legacy in the legal realm, no 
‘man of law’ has taken up his challenge to truly study Krazy Kat. Likewise, 
no account of Llewellyn’s work mentions Krazy Kat, even in passing. At 
the time of Llewellyn’s review, law’s failure to take Krazy Kat seriously 
was part of a broader reluctance, or even refusal, to critically analyse any 
particular piece of mass culture. Law, of course, was not unique in its 
treatment of mass culture.4 Yet, as other disciplines began to embrace 
popular culture, legal studies still retained an isolation based, according to 
Anthony Chase, on a professionalised predilection for both ‘pure academic 
subjects’ and the power provided by ‘monopolies of credibility’ (1986: 541). 
Since Chase wrote in the mid 1980s, legal studies have begun to make up 
for lost ground. Despite this, Krazy Kat  –  ‘“the Leonardo da Vinci” of 
the comics’ (Carlin 2005: 35) which has generated extensive commentary 
in literary, cultural studies, and comic circles  – has remained untouched 
by legal writing, despite one of the twenty most-cited legal scholars of 
all-time5 pronouncing that no lawyer should leave Krazy Kat ‘unstudied ’.
Nonetheless, Llewellyn’s attempt at an analysis of Krazy Kat, while 
admirable, remains deeply unsatisfactory. The theme of transcendent 
love, while widely commented upon in other sources, does not capture 
the complex and surreal play between law, transgression and its subjects 
that, when undone, creates a chain reaction to nothingness – as evident 
in figure 1. Llewellyn’s reflections on individualism and order seem 
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wholly inadequate for the macro-yet-subjective presentation of law 
underpinning the strip. While Llewellyn’s review appears to pick up 
on disparate nodes, or riffs, of law in Krazy Kat, it fails to capture the 
whole expression of the law in Herriman’s comic. Llewellyn seems to 
have been sensitive to the relations that were animating the strip, yet 
his review fails to address the stage upon which they are played, an 
omission which is made glaring when Herriman disrobes law into a 
quiet, starry desert (figure 1).
I contend that the surreal riffs and fugues of law in Krazy Kat are 
best understood through a hybridized framework of legal formalism, 
legal realism, and the Surrealist union of contradictions which I have 
termed legal surrealism. Concurrent with Krazy Kat ’s three decade 
run in American newspapers, André Breton and the Surrealists were 
challenging objectivity, rationality, and nihilism on the aesthetic and 
cultural battlefield in Europe. It was also at this time that Karl Llewellyn 
led the legal realist charge against the abstracted logic of formalism in 
American law. To reveal the legal surrealism of Krazy Kat, these three 
meaningfully coincidental worlds – comic, cultural, and legal – will be 
interwoven to produce a sort of Magritte lumière des coincidence.
In part 1, I will introduce the world of Krazy Kat and the comic 
medium, focusing on its political economy and form. I will also explore 
the idiosyncratic symbolic relation between law and desire native to 
Herriman’s work. In part 2, I will examine the ideas and aesthetics of 
the Surrealists, paying particular attention to the aspects of their work 
which managed to migrate across the Atlantic. Here, I will also explore 
in what vein Krazy Kat has been labelled surreal by critics, not in the 
hope of proclaiming Krazy Kat a Surrealist work but rather to pinpoint 
a frame wherein Surrealist ideas may illuminate the comic. In part 3, 
I will outline the ideas surrounding the rise of legal realism against 
legal formalism in America, laying bare the legal surrealist space that 
was created in the process. Overall, my hope is to capture the legal 
surrealist composition of Krazy Kat, a vision that foregrounds the aporia 
within law as an essential and inherent aspect of its surreal structure.
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Figure 2: (Herriman 6 October 1940: 150) 
© King Features Syndicate, Inc.
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1 Krazy Kat at Eternal Play
Law and desire appear to stand in an antithetical or dialectical 
relationship to each other. Law struggles to control, direct, or repress 
desire, and desire attempts to express itself by eluding the strategies 
of lawful control. This agonistic relationship between law and desire 
is, in effect, a play of forces.
Mark C. Taylor, ‘Desire of Law, Law of Desire’ (1990: 1269 emphasis 
shifted from forces)
In the earliest versions of Krazy Kat, desire was depicted as 
uncomplicated and unidirectional. The kat and mouse, time-honoured 
foes, first appeared underfoot, nestled at the bottom of Herriman’s The 
Dingbat Family on July 26, 1910. Below the Dingbat’s shenanigans, 
a small mouse scurried over to a stone and simply tossed it at the kat, 
hitting her in the head and leaving her perplexed in the final frame. 
The straightforward humour flipped the traditional cat-and-mouse 
game, creating an appealing David and Goliath narrative of undiluted 
slapstick. From these origins, Krazy Kat would eventually expand 
beyond the confines of The Dingbat Family to its own eponymous strip 
on October 28, 1913, and continue well beyond The Dingbat Family’s 
end in 1916.
Krazy Kat did not debut fully formed; in Herriman’s words, ‘Krazy 
Kat was not conceived, not born, it jes’ grew’ (qtd in McDonnell et al 
1986: 54). It was a month after the kat and mouse’s debut that Herriman 
introduced another key element, when Krazy planted a kiss on Ignatz 
while he slept; a kiss of which Ignatz would never become aware: ‘I 
dreamed an angel kissed me’ (McDonnell et al 1986: 55). Krazy, who 
had developed a sweetness and innocence of character, had fallen in 
love with Ignatz and wanted to be hit, interpreting each act of violence 
as a sign of undying affection from her ‘li’l aingil’. With these small 
changes, Herriman had expanded and reciprocated the desire which 
drove the action of Krazy Kat.
Ignatz, compelled by his complementary hatred, continued to pelt 
the kat’s head despite her affection, but had developed a predilection 
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towards a particular projectile: the brick. For Adam Gopnik, this 
brick (and Krazy Kat itself) is Edenic; Ignatz cannot inflict pain in 
this comic land as ‘each brick is transformed in midair into a bouquet’ 
(1986), bouncing off Krazy’s head as a little heart forms from impact. 
A social relation of pure desire is thus anchored to the brick but the 
brutality it could represent is entirely vitiated.
The law appears to have grown into a recurring interest within 
Krazy Kat when Bull Pupp, originally a secondary character, became 
gainfully employed as Offissa B. Pupp, thus forming the third point 
of the  ‘essential triangle’ (Gopnik 1986) of Krazy Kat ’s drama. At first 
glance, Pupp is personally inspired to thwart Ignatz’s brick throwing 
because he is in love with Krazy. However, he is also clearly invested in 
what Gopnik describes as an aesthetic commitment to abstract formal 
justice and order, representing ‘Law as pure form’ (1986). Offissa Pupp 
added a new intrigue and punchline to the slapstick: Ignatz would now 
need to evade the law to succeed in his destructive goal, and his usual 
rendition into Coconino County’s single, unwavering jail would serve 
as the fitting final note to the tumult of Krazy, Ignatz, and Pupp’s 
relationship. This simple plot  – cat loves mouse, mouse hates cat, 
mouse eludes dog to throw brick at cat, dog enforces the law by putting 
mouse in jail  – would become the recurring structure of Herriman’s 
three decade comic-fugue.
When Krazy Kat began, comics were considered disposable culture, 
designed to be consumed and thrown away with the daily news. A 
single day’s strip needed to concurrently stand alone and be familiar, 
paralleling the consumption practices of the newspaper. Since the 
news was published daily, a new comic was needed daily; since the 
news carried on indefinitely, a comic needed to do the same. For this 
reason, Robert Warshow wrote in 1946 that ‘the comic strip has no 
beginning and no end, only an eternal middle’(1946: 65). Warshow’s 
article was intended to criticize what he called ‘lumpen culture’, or 
nihilistic works which break down all cultural or societal distinctions. 
However, if we eliminate the class-based value judgement of aesthetics 
in his critique  – removing, in Franklin Rosemount’s words, ‘the ill-
42
Dahlman
concealed sneer of the snob’ (1987: 122) – then an important point 
emerges about comics of the era, particularly Krazy Kat. In comics, 
the plot is not the unanticipated narrative of the work, not a linear 
force leading a beginning rationally to its determined end. Instead, 
plot operates as a preamble of conditions, the stage upon which the 
comic actors play. Daily strips foreground the relationship itself, for it is 
that dynamic which provides the infinite variation necessary for a strip 
to remain engrossing within the confines of a singular plot repeated 
indefinitely. The plot is mere expectation to be mined and undermined 
for comic effect whereas the dynamic itself,  or the play of relations, is 
the message of a turn of the century comic. Each day, the forces the 
plot has established are unleashed, and each day they play out anew 
within the borders of its panels.
Krazy, in her naive innocence, sees Ignatz and Pupp’s relationship 
not as ‘a deadly war’ as Seldes imagines (Seldes 1924: 17), but one of 
play: ‘it must be a l’il game, [Igntaz] an’ Offissa Pupp is playing – so I 
wunt inta-fee’ (Herriman 3 November 1935: 194). Herriman replaced 
the traditional game of cat and mouse with the game of law and mouse, 
like many police serial dramas before it, but with one key difference. 
Instead of the cat and mouse game driving the plot – whereby a capture 
typically solves the mystery and relieves the climatic tension of the story 
– here the law and mouse game is simply an ontological condition, an 
unending, surreal desert of metaphysical recurrence. The turn of the 
century comic took the decisive rationality of plot and turned it into 
the recurring setting for eternal play.
Herriman is constantly highlighting that Ignatz and Pupp are at 
play, and as a comic strip, this play expresses the dynamic between 
Offissa Pupp’s pure law and Ignatz’s insatiable transgressive desire. Of 
course, this desire is not limited to Ignatz; both Ignatz and Krazy share 
the same desire, represented in the image of the brick-turned-bouquet. 
Thus, the desire represented by the brick must be considered broadly 
social, both an active and passive force that cannot be reduced to any 
individual. The action of Krazy Kat, whenever Offissa Pupp is involved, 
is thus the interplay of desire and law, the animating force of the strip.
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Mark C. Taylor, in his writing on law in ‘Desire of Law, Law of 
Desire’, captures both the plot and animus of Krazy Kat beautifully 
when he notes the legal dialectic Stanley Fish glossed in arguing ‘The 
Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence’:
In wishing to have a formal existence, Fish argues the law wishes its 
own autonomy ... it wishes to be only itself. This wish, however, is 
impossible. By wishing to be itself, the law is found wanting. To desire 
is to want and to want is to lack. The desire for autonomy, therefore, 
testifies to its lack. Never able to be only itself, that law is forever 
wanting. The lack of law is the opening of transgression. Transgression, 
which in one sense is what the law does not want, is also precisely what 
the law desires (1990: 1269).
This is why earlier, Taylor writes ‘to think the complicity of law and 
desire is, in the final analysis, to discover that the law does not exist’ 
(1990: 1269). In Krazy Kat ’s terms, the pure law Offissa Pupp represents 
simply does not exist, and it demands the presence of Ignatz and Krazy’s 
repressed desire for it to make its desirous, formalist claim. Here, we 
are firmly in the territory of the Krazy Kat strip of figure 1. If the 
punishment disappears, so does the demarcation of transgression, which 
initiates a domino obliteration of the very tension between rules and 
transgression that holds the law together: No jail, no brick, no mouse, 
no kat, and finally no pupp, leaving only an empty landscape. The 
plot, which is the landscape of Krazy Kat, is an assembly of buttressing 
tensions which the comic draws from the nature of law itself.
As to the animus of Krazy Kat – Krazy, Ignatz, and Pupp’s eternally 
repeating play –  Taylor is equally prescient:
To interpret transgression as the desire of law is to refigure the 
relationship between law and desire. Law and desire appear to stand in 
an antithetical or dialectical relationship to each other. Law struggles 
to control, direct, or repress desire, and desire attempts to express itself 
by eluding the strategies of lawful control. This agonistic relationship 
between law and desire is, in effect, a play of forces. Expression and 
repression are locked in endless struggle (1990: 1269).
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Krazy Kat is thus specially equipped to express this ‘endless struggle’ 
of law because of its medium characteristics, which each day explore a 
new contour of a particular relation. In this sense, Krazy Kat concerns 
itself with the ‘other dimension of law’ that Pierre Legendre specifies 
as the ‘atomic bond of law’, that is the ‘primary material of man: biology, 
the social, the unconscious’ to which the law must address itself but from 
which the law must also be formulated (1998: 184-5). Herriman’s 
eternal triangle effectively locates the endless struggle of law at desire 
and law’s interstices. The transgression, the brick, the atomic bond, 
becomes the very thing from which the jail is built: when Miss Kwakk 
Wakk asks ‘A wooden jail wouldn’t do, eh – sir?’ Offissa Pupp replies 
‘We of the Konstabulary find bricks is best – Madame’ (figure 2). 
The bricks in Krazy Kat bring together subjectivity, order, and power, 
demanding each force exert itself upon and through it without any 
resolution, only a cohesive tension. And so if the law and its subjects, 
order and desire, are intertwined in this sense – a co-defining yet 
contradictory ‘difference without which we cannot live’ (Taylor 1990: 
1274) – then the brick is Herriman’s poetic union of law’s contradictions.
2 A Constant Cell on a Fluid Landscape
Underlying the Surrealists’ commitment to the irrational and the 
absurd was an intention to destroy the Western dualistic view of 
good and evil. Equally, they sought to destroy the existing dichotomy 
between reason and madness, sleep and waking, seriousness and 
humour. In fact, this paradox of the denial of opposites (or the 
necessary union of contradictions) is the dialectical key to Surrealism.
Suzi Gablik Magritte (1970: 56)
A common refrain amongst the commentators and critics of Krazy Kat 
is to note the presence of the surreal in Herriman’s work.6  However, 
use of the concept in Krazy Kat commentary has been desultory, and 
the lack of rigour has greatly diluted its conceptual value. The term 
‘surreal’ is often used in relation to Krazy Kat ’s landscapes, but most 
use it simply as a vague descriptor.7  Generally, term surreal is a cultural 
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shorthand, tapping into a vast reservoir of meaning without providing 
much precision, and in the process underming any of the critical value 
that may come from describing Krazy Kat as surreal.
To be fair, some critics have provided more exactitude, taking 
care to triangulate their use of the term surreal. For example, Carlin 
suggests Krazy Kat demonstrates ‘Herriman’s ability to suggest surreal 
landscapes that are neither grotesque nor sentimental’ (2005: 46) in the 
combination of discontinuity and shifting scenery. Carlin’s attention 
is largely drawn to the flux: ‘The backgrounds are desert scenes of the 
American Southwest that shift from panel to panel without apparent 
continuity in a way that makes them more surreal than representational’ 
(2005: 42). This characteristic of Krazy Kat ’s Coconino County is 
perhaps best articulated by Jay Cantor in his literary continuation 
of Krazy Kat titled Krazy Kat: A Novel in Five Panels: ‘this was 
Coconino, and the boulder that Kiyote was to hide behind was a cloud 
by afternoon’, and then later, ‘Too late. The cloud had become a tree’ 
(1988: 148). However, beyond stating that this protean land is surreal, 
these critics still confine themselves to the level of mere description, 
giving a reader very little idea as to what, exactly, can be understood 
from the term.
Clearly, the surreal in Krazy Kat demands a more careful analysis. 
And the contemporaneous Surrealist movement – those who, according 
to Michel Carrouges, ‘unleash the spirit of negation like a corrosive 
acid that will dissolve social and cultural prejudices ... Yet at the same 
time ... are the demiurges of new worlds in perpetual expansion’ (1974: 
3) – are well suited to provide some conceptual aid.
A few theorists have seized on this impulse to read Krazy Kat 
through a Surrealist lens, but have generally only succeeded in noting 
shallow similarities between the movement and the comic.8 Adam 
Gopnik is arguably the most successful at analysing Surrealism’s 
relation to Krazy Kat in his ‘The Genius of George Herriman’(1986). 
Gopnik writes in response to the editors of Krazy Kat: The Comic Art 
of George Herriman, who dismissed Umberto Eco’s claim that the 
landscapes in Krazy Kat appear surreal.  Instead, the editors suggest that 
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Krazy Kat displays an inherent realism, citing as evidence Herriman’s 
regular visits to the surreal-in-appearance Coconino County in Arizona 
(McDonnell et al 1986: 73). Gopnik’s counter cuts to the heart of Krazy 
Kat ’s aesthetic resemblance to Surrealism:
When Eco or anyone else refers to surreal elements in Krazy Kat 
he doesn’t mean that the landscape looks strange. They mean that 
Herriman seems to respond, with uncanny coincidence of imagination, 
to the same mix of places, myths, ambitions, and goals that moves 
surrealism proper: the same fascination with aboriginal art, the same 
love of anthropomorphic beastiaries, the same feeling for eloquent 
illogic, the same love for desert landscapes (1986: par 24).
After drawing extensive parallels between Herriman, Max Ernst, and 
Joan Miró, Gopnik writes that their relation is like ‘any two animals 
have who descend from a common ancestor’ (1986: par 29). Surrealist 
ideas, then, will not explicate the action of Krazy Kat when applied 
blindly; rather, one should look to Surrealist techniques to uncover the 
particular aesthetics and mechanics of Krazy Kat wherein the comic’s 
own structured meaning may lie. It is a search for common adaptations 
amongst genetic relatives.
The Surrealist movement, originally touted as ‘a movement capable 
of proposing an afterlife for cubism, futurism, and Dadaism’ (Durozoi 
1997: 38), emerged from the ashes of Dada after it had collapsed under 
the weight of its own nihilism. According to Carrouges, Dadaism was 
‘a chemically unstable body since it was by definition the negation of 
any positions ... [and] by its very nature excluded all sustained action, 
all possibility of development’ (1974: 5). However, its intellectual legacy 
of liberation ‘from the bonds of habit’ (Carrouges 1974: 5) allowed 
Surrealism to flow from its wake. The Surrealist movement officially 
announced its existence by opening the Bureau of Surrealist Research 
in Paris on October 11, 1924 (Durozoi 1997: 63). Three days later, 
the movement’s de facto leader André Breton released The Surrealist 
Manifesto, proclaiming the Surrealists’ project of resolving ‘two states, 
dream and reality, which are seemingly so contradictory, into a kind of 
absolute reality, a surreality’ (1972: 14). Surrealist techniques, such as 
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disintegration and automatism, attempted to circumvent the demands 
of conscious rationalism and emphasized the exploration of unconscious 
creativity and spontaneity, attempting to locate a natural link between 
the particular and the universal or ‘an active synthesis of the subjective 
and the objective’ (Carrouges 1974: 179). As Breton would later state in 
a 1934 address, Surrealism’s aim was to ‘bring about the state where the 
distinction between the subjective and the objective loses its necessity 
and its value’ (1934: par 42). Ultimately, Surrealism’s revolutionary goal 
was what Carrouges terms ‘dialectical humanism’ (1974: 276), the first 
necessary step towards true Marxian liberation: ‘the liberation of mind’ 
thus leading to ‘the liberation of man’.
Those within the Surrealist inner-circle would fluctuate greatly over 
time, but the Surrealists were perhaps best known for their prominent 
visual artists: Max Ernst, Giorgio de Chirico, Joan Miró, René 
Magritte and Salvador Dalí. In 1928, Breton wrote the essay Surrealism 
and Painting to explore the medium that The Manifesto of Surrealism 
had failed to address. Breton never explicitly defines Surrealist Art but 
he does provide ‘an exploration of the ways in which visual art and the 
surrealist viewpoint might complement each other’ (1965: xix). Given 
Surrealism’s philosophical goal, a key element to both its art and its 
poetry was juxtaposition. In the Manifesto of Surrealism, Breton revealed 
the inspiration he drew from a key passage of Pierre Reverdy’s writing:
The image is a pure creation of the mind.
It cannot be born from a comparison but from a juxtaposition of two more 
or less distant realities.
The more the relationship between the two juxtaposed realities is distant 
and true, the stronger the image will be – the greater its emotional power 
and poetic reality... (1972: 20).
The Surrealist image, then, was ideally a spontaneous and genuine 
combination of distant realities, unified not rationally for the purpose 
of contrast but as an expression of scrupulous Surrealist thought. 
Juxtaposition, in its mechanics, reaches towards the synthesis the 
Surrealists desired, and so it was celebrated as a royal road to authentic 
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meaning. This is the source of Breton’s infatuation with the phrase-
image upon which he dwells in The Manifesto of Surrealism: ‘There is a 
man cut in two by the window’ (1972: 21). While even the grammatical 
meaning is clearly ambiguous, producing two possible constructions 
– the man may be by a window, cut in two; or it is the window itself 
which has cut the man in two9  – it is only the latter construction which 
is overtly consumed by its juxtaposition. The image is at once an image 
of the modern man severed into two by modern rationality – the real 
and the dream; the objective and subjective – yet provides hope for 
glimpsing his other half through the window: a refractive frame which 
is at once transparent and reflective. The man-window juxtaposition at 
once declares Surrealism’s preoccupations but also the potential of its 
ultimate goals. In Surrealism and Painting, Breton valourises a similar 
mechanism in painting:
The idea of painting should be viewed in the same light as the hypnagogic 
visions such as that recorded by René Guyon: ‘I compared the appearance 
of the eyes of this terrible head to that of the little strips of red tinsel 
that decorate the lips of chocolate cigars, and the brown hue of the 
head itself reminded me of the colour of those same cigars’  (1965: 28).
Later, Breton would delight in Edgar Allen Poe’s description of 
‘the chemistry of the intellect, that the admixture of two elements results in a 
something that has nothing of the qualities of one of them, or even nothing of the 
qualities of either’(1965: 35) and would praise ‘the absolutely devastating 
equilibrium’ of Miró’s juxtapositions (1965: 40). As Suzi Gablik would 
stress in her work on Magritte, the ‘dialectical key’ to Surrealist art and 
practice was ‘this paradox of the denial of opposites (or the necessary 
union of contradictions)’ (1970: 56). The Surrealist image is a unification 
of discordant harmony, a meaningful marriage of the disparate-yet-
connected, revealing an essence of existence invisible to the rational eye.
Interestingly, when Surrealism migrated to America in the 1920s 
and 1930s, it tended to lose its politics in transition. While surreal 
imagery was welcomed into American popular culture and imagination 
– for example, turning Salvador Dalí into a Hollywood star – its 
revolutionary, Marxist politics were entirely lost upon an American 
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audience who did not share the same concerns as Europe after the First 
World War. Keith L. Eggener notes that, especially with the popular 
appeal of Freudian psychoanalysis in the United States, Americans 
were strongly attracted to Surrealism’s bizarre forms and dream-like 
subject matter (1993: 36-9). As for its politics, Eggener bluntly states 
that ‘for most American authors, Surrealism did not mean revolution, 
either psychic or social ... Surrealist politics were variously ignored, 
misunderstood, dismissed, or derided in the United States’ (1993: 33-5).
Looking to Krazy Kat, the shedding of Surrealist politics in 
America is an important caveat. As Inge observes in his piece 
regarding Herriman, the Dadaists and Surrealists, ‘the artist in this 
case [Herriman] was not responding to the collapse of rationalism or 
the emotional impact of World War I, nor was he declaring war on 
the traditional standards of art and aesthetics’ (1990: 44). Surrealism’s 
reception in America suggests that for Krazy Kat, the relevance is not 
Surrealism’s political philosophies but rather its aesthetic frame: the 
union of contradictions.  While the comic and Surrealism are unlikely 
to have the same source, surreal depictions in America share both 
structure and effect with their Surrealist cousins.
With an eye to the representation of legality, Krazy Kat ’s recurring 
Surrealist union of contradictions par excellence, especially enunciated 
in the latter years of the comic’s run, is the image of the unvarying 
jail moored upon the amorphous desert. In a comic so inundated with 
flux and ephemerality, wherein Herriman took great liberties with 
the continuity of both the buildings and the landscape of Coconino 
County, the jail remained its one consistent and stable element. The 
final image in the closing paragraph of Jay Cantor’s Krazy Kat: A Novel 
in Five Panels perhaps captures the juxtaposition at its most poetic:
On a deserted mesa wind blew into a house that now had only three 
walls left, no, two, no one. Tumbleweed blew past a table, shaking a 
cup that seemed to have been half dissolved by the wind, a partial cup 
that, as the table disappeared, stood in midair. Outside – if one can 
speak of an outside when there is only one wall – was a small empty 
stone building, unchanging, eternally itself, with a faded wooden sign 
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of the door: JAIL. Behind it, a cactus turned into church spires, and a 
mesa in the background became maroon bells for the spire (1988 : 245).
A common final panel of a Krazy Kat comic was the image of Ignatz 
locked up in jail drawn upon a desert landscape, but the features of 
that landscape varied with every new strip. Thus while each closing 
panel is intuitively solid, without discontinuity, it is over time that 
the ‘devastating equilibrium’ affixing the jail to the unstable land it 
polices becomes apparent. Taken together, Krazy Kat ’s closing panels 
demonstrate a sustained reflection on the nature of law, juxtaposing 
and thus admixing pure law with the tumult of its social surrounding. 
Within each panel there are two visions of law operating  – one 
abstracted and unchanging and the other adaptive and in flux  – tied 
together as the law of Coconino County. Krazy Kat is deploying an 
image which contends law to be a union of contradictions: a constant 
cell on a fluid landscape.  The image is an embodiment of what I term 
legal surrealism.
3 From Legal Realism to Legal Surrealism
Figure 3: (Herriman 28 July 1942: 105) 
© King Features Syndicate, Inc.
Lovers and madmen have such seething brains, 
Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend 
More than cool reason ever comprehends. 
The lunatic, the lawyer, and the lover 
Are of imagination all compact.
-William Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream (V.i.4-8), with 
Llewellyn’s edit (2008: 88)
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In the final frame of the figure 3, Ignatz is startled to recognize his 
unmoving self stencilled onto the facade of the Coconino County jail. 
Immediately recognizable is the frame of Herriman’s surreal union 
of contradictions: a new iteration of the landscape accompanies the 
unwavering jail’s form. Here, the depiction of Ignatz evokes the Surrealist 
man cut in two by a window (though this time, a window with bars). There 
is an ideological element of Althusserian interpellation (1971: 44-51) at 
play too: the jail is calling Ignatz into the role of subject of law long before 
he launches a single brick. Further, Ignatz’s punch(line) of recognition is 
particularly reminiscent of Franz Kafka’s parable ‘Before the Law’ from 
his unfinished novel The Trial. A story from ‘the introductory writings 
to law’, a country man spends his entire life waiting at the gates ‘before 
the law’ only to be denied entry up until the expiry of his life. As he dies, 
he demands of the gatekeeper, ‘How is it that in all these years nobody 
except myself has asked for admittance?’:
The door-keeper realizes the man has reached the end of his life and, 
to penetrate his imperfect hearing, he roars at him: ‘Nobody else could 
gain admittance here, this entrance was meant only for you. I shall now 
go and close it’ (1994: 166-7).
The logic of the gatekeeper is the same logic that compelled the unnamed 
dog-artist to decide the jail was incomplete without  ‘mouse’. In Desmond 
Manderson’s words, the gatekeeper’s logic is ‘indistinguishable from a 
nightmare’s relentless illogic’ (2008: 3). Manderson proposes that while 
Kafka’s story may be taken as a cruel joke, it may also be a condemnation 
of the detached logic of the law, a call ‘to care less about abstractions and 
more about individual lives’ (2008: 3).
The legal realist movement levelled a parallel critique at the abstracted 
logic of legal formalism. Epitomized by the writings of Karl Llewellyn 
in the 1930s, legal realism developed in the same era as Kafka, the 
Surrealists, and Krazy Kat. This is not to suggest that Herriman was 
necessarily familiar with the debate, but rather that the shift in cultural 
understanding of law opened a space which Herriman was already 
inhabiting intuitively and had developed through the comic medium. 
Krazy Kat demonstrates that legal formalism and legal realism are neither 
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exclusive nor competing theories of law, but instead coexist paradoxically, 
held together in a union of contradictions.
Though Duncan Kennedy (2001) has written that legal formalism is an 
essentially contested category in each of the fields in which it is mobilized, 
for these purposes I will focus on the term’s usage by the legal realists 
to categorize mainstream legal thought dominating America in the 19th 
Century.10  Self conceptualized as an ‘apolitical rationalization project’ 
(Kennedy 2004: 1034), legal formalism stressed deductive logic from legal 
principles and abstraction to the universal in the pursuit of a coherent set 
of legal rules, understood to be both desirable and achievable through the 
realization of individual will as protected by the state.11  These principles 
would inform the assumptions for Christopher Langdell’s development 
of the case method of legal pedagogy in the late 19th Century, in which 
law was treated as a science which ‘conjured up the ideas of order, system, 
simplicity, and original sources’ (Twining 1973: 12). For legal formalism, 
‘law was discovered, not made, and ... each discovery was rooted in an 
absolute’ (Hull 1997: 34). Law was a stable array of principles awaiting 
only detection, apprehension, and application.
Legal formalism’s insistence on a systematic coherence rendered the 
law a conservative force, since ‘a system of legal reasoning based on fixed 
principles could hardly declare that these principles had suddenly changed’ 
(Hull 1997: 35). This focus also demanded a deductive and universalist 
approach to legal reasoning, meaning the focus was on the structural 
integrity of the whole without attention to the ramifications of specific 
application. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., a student of Langdell’s at Harvard 
and a precursor to legal realism, took issue with his former teacher on 
these fronts, labelling Langdell ‘the greatest living legal theologian ... less 
concerned with his postulates than to show that the conclusions from them 
hang together’ (Twining 1973: 15) and attacking ‘the fallacy of the logical 
form ... the notion that the only force at work in the development of law 
is logic’ (Twining 1973: 17) so embedded in formalist thinking.12  Logical 
coherence of law and deductive reasoning were the cornerstones of a legal 
formalist approach, insisting that adherence to abstracted reason in the 
application of rules produced just, universal law. Sociological jurists, such 
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as Holmes, undermined those claims, suggesting that legal formalism 
served only to obscure a judge’s biases, maintaining the appearance of 
objectivity while preventing adjudication from serving social purposes or 
adapting to an ever-changing society (Kennedy 2001: 8635). These jurists 
cited abuses of deduction in decisions and instances of incoherence in the 
application of legal principles as evidence for their claims.
An offshoot of this revolt against formalism, the movement of legal 
realism arose with Llewellyn as their de facto leader when he published 
‘A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step’ in April of 1930. Llewellyn 
wrote that, in situations where the doctrine is well settled, judges are 
likely to declare the question of ‘what the law ought to do’ as ‘irrelevant 
speculation’, whereas if the doctrine is without clear answer, suddenly a 
judge is more interested in the question of ‘ought’ (1930: 432). Drawing 
upon this discrepancy, Llewellyn proposed that rights and principles are 
not ends in and of themselves, but means to social ends. Legal realism did 
not seek to overthrow rules but only remove them from the focal point 
of law, and replace that focus with ‘the area of contact between judicial 
(or official) behavior and the behavior of laymen’ (Llewellyn 1930: 443). 
Principles were not self evident in their existence, they were not to be 
generalized without investigation into their application in a particular 
circumstance, and they were considered to have social purposes and not 
reified value.
Interestingly, Llewellyn felt that realist concerns sometimes cropped 
up in legal formalist approaches, but only ad hoc, for a particular challenge, 
a reworking that ‘is no part of the standard equipment of investigation, 
discussion, synthesis: it is a part only of the equipment of defence’ (1930: 
444-5). Llewellyn described this relation of formalism and realism in 
a poetic image that, though it feels torn from the pages of Krazy Kat, 
showed the two legal philosophies to be in an unbalanced state, noticeably 
lacking juxtaposition:
When [legal realism is] used apart from combat, as a result of a worker’s 
own curiosity or of some sudden fact-stimulus outside, it flares like a 
shooting star, and disappears. Always the night of words will close again 
in beauty over the wild, streaked disturbance (1930: 445).
54
Dahlman
Here, Llewellyn aligns legal realism with the tumult of the real world 
– the fact of ephemerality and not the unflinching ‘night of words’. As 
Llewellyn would later highlight in his list of ‘common points of departure’ 
for legal realism, law is in flux, as is society, but society evolves faster, so 
law must continually adapt to best serve its society (1931: 1235-6). Law 
was inherently a social product of real people and real, evolving relations. 
The legal realists wished this social aspect of law to define its development, 
allowing it to embrace societal change explicitly rather than ensconcing 
itself beneath a costume of deductive reasoning.
Legal realism also rejected legal formalism’s ‘Transcendental 
Nonsense’ (as Felix Cohen put it). Reified legal concepts were labelled 
‘legal magic and word-jugglery’ (1935: 821) for their lack of basis in social 
experience. Cohen lambasted legal rule justifications for ‘arguing in a 
vicious circle’ (1935: 814), in other words, rejecting pure legal reasoning 
for functioning only through blind faith in a fallacious, self-justifying 
principle. The Surrealists, too, were rebelling against a broader reign of 
logic, and it is fascinating to note Breton’s similar terms of engagement 
to the legal realists:
We are still living under the reign of logic: this, of course, is what I have 
been driving at. But in this day and age logical methods are applicable 
only to solving problems of secondary interest. The absolute rationalism 
that is still in vogue allows us to consider only facets relating directly 
to our experience. Logical ends, on the contrary, escape us (1972: 9).
Both Surrealism and legal realism rejected a sort of abstracted objectivity 
in order to explore more subjective realms, albeit with extremely different 
methodologies. While the Surrealists embraced aesthetic techniques 
to reach beyond rationalism, legal realism would valourize sociological 
methodologies to address the ‘true’, subjective experience of law.
Significantly, both Surrealism and legal realism insisted on the 
continued existence of and hybridization with its other half. It is a 
misinterpretation of each to suggest that either was invested in the 
obliteration of rationalism: Breton’s ultimate goal was to find a new 
synthesis of dream and reality to form the intuitively contradictory 
surreality (1970: 14); and Llewellyn would insist that legal formalism’s 
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rules were not to be eliminated entirely, but rather set in perspective (1930: 
453). In Llewellyn’s imagery, this ultimate goal would be the flash of the 
shooting star remaining indefinitely superimposed over the night sky – a 
surreal juxtaposition.
While the telling of an intellectual history often implies vanquishment 
and resolution, a triumph of one movement over another in the marketplace 
of ideas, it is rare that ideas are obliterated from cultural existence. Even 
if the phrase ‘we’re all legal realists now’ is so overused that it is even a 
cliché to call it a cliché (Green 2005: 1917), legal formalism can still be 
found in legal theory (Weinrib 2010). More importantly, legal formalism 
still plays a major role in judges’ decisions, legal formation, and popular 
understanding of law. Deductive reasoning, coherent order, universal 
pretentions all remain active parts of the law, though they can no longer 
claim to be the entirety of the law. In this sense, the legal realists did not 
just reveal a new functional approach that stressed instrumental effects, 
particular facts, and the subjective moment of encounter with the law. 
Legal realism also opened a liminal space wherein both legal realist and 
formalist claims work alongside each other, despite their incongruities; 
they are two poles which are both to be taken seriously and between which 
law’s daily function lies. By insisting law be aware of all the elements that 
lay outside its formal existence while still maintaining the legitimacy of 
legal rules, legal realism restored law to its contradictory, surreal spirit.
This is the domain of legal surrealism, the image of law that legal 
surrealism proposes. Law is a functional paradox, a ‘distant but true’ 
juxtaposition of great power. It is at once abstracted and instrumental, 
subjective and objective, transcendental and immanent. This does 
not mean law is a fusion of these elements, but a Surrealist union of 
contradictions. The law is not a sublime machine of natural science, nor 
an instrumental panacea of social governance. It is a structure built of 
dovetails, where any given hinge contains a foundational, functional 
contradiction. Legal surrealism, then, is the critical search for law’s 
foundational dovetails, its bonding aporias.
Herriman’s representation of law in Krazy Kat is filled with particularly 
astute legal surrealist images. Thinking of Offissa Pupp  – an urban beat 
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cop drawn in the landscape where, in American pop culture, a sheriff 
would typically reside  – it is clear Herriman was addressing himself to a 
governing, bureaucratic, modern legal system. The setting of Krazy Kat is 
not a lawless land demanding the civilizing imposition of law, but rather 
a milieu where law exists as a part of the social and material landscape. 
In part 1, the brick of Krazy Kat was shown to be a symbolic apex of the 
relationship between law and desire, a paradoxical dynamic that structured 
the field of law and its relationship with its subjects. In part 2, the surrealist 
concept of union of contradictions pointed to Herriman’s recurring final 
panel of a constant cell on a fluid landscape, and an examination of the 
cotemporaneous flux between legal formalism and legal realism gives that 
surrealist image legal content. The jail, in its fixity, exudes the qualities of 
law to which legal formalism aspired – a coherent, ‘unchanged, eternally 
itself ’ (Cantor 1988: 3) structure, abstracted entirely from the landscape. 
The protean terrain, on the other hand, reflects the aspect of law that the 
legal realists felt formalism obscured – the flux and tumult of the social 
which produced the same phenomenon in law. Taken together, they reveal 
a surreal space of discontinuity within the law which Herriman exploited 
and explored in Krazy Kat.
Returning to Ignatz’s self-encounter in the law in figure 3, a legal 
surrealist lens immediately foregrounds the discontinuity between Ignatz’s 
subjectivity and his objective portrayal by the law. The little lines around 
Ignatz show him in a dynamic double-take, whereas his artistic rendition 
painted on the jailhouse is frozen in sin. The jail anticipates him not as 
an individual but as ‘mouse’. The ‘mouse’ thus represents the abstracted 
reason for the jail’s existence, that which the jail is entirely incomplete (or 
‘not good’) without. Ignatz’s surprise cannot be that he sees himself in 
jail – after all, that occurs fairly regularly – but rather how flat and listless 
he is rendered in anticipation as a means to law’s self-justifying ends. 
Nonetheless, the moment also dramatizes self recognition within the law, 
of identification, of subjectivity captured. Law, to be formally whole, must 
flatten ‘mouse’ objectively and Ignatz, as a subject of law, finds himself 
in surreal surprise in the presence of his static twin. The contradiction 
between actual sin and abstracted sin, unified in the subjective encounter 
of formal law, is at the heart of the debate between legal formalists and 
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legal realists, and is an integral dovetail to law’s structure. That we can 
identify ourselves in abstracted forms lends formalism objective validity; 
that those forms look so uncannily disconnected, so frozen and flat, 
demands a concurrent, constant return to legal realism. Such a union of 
contradictions is the assertion of legal surrealism, the lifeblood of Krazy 
Kat, and the essence of law.
Conclusion – Herriman’s Legal Surrealism
I am not convinced Llewellyn would necessarily have found the 
instrumental value he desired in legal surrealism. To open his ‘A Realistic 
Jurisprudence – The Next Step’, Llewellyn writes:
The difficulty in framing any concept of ‘law’ is that there are so many 
things to be included, and the things to be included are so unbelievably 
different from each other. Perhaps it is possible to get them all under 
one verbal roof. But I do not see what you have accomplished if you do. 
For a concept, as I understand it, is built for a purpose. It is a thinking 
tool. It is to make your data more manageable in doing something, in 
getting somewhere with them. And I have not yet met the job, or heard 
of it, to which all the data that associate themselves with the loosest of 
suggestive symbols, ‘law,’ are relevant at once (19301: 143).
Legal realism’s drive to instrumentalise law, to make it amenable to 
governance and the achievement of social goals, is not the value Krazy Kat 
has to offer. But in Llewellyn’s desire to shift the focus of law from the 
abstracted forum of legal logic to the area of contact between the subject 
of law and the agents of law, Krazy Kat displayed ‘the true essence of [a 
jurist’s] job’ (1947: 337). At that time, through the eternal play between 
Krazy Kat, Ignatz, and Offissa Pup, Herriman was depicting the field of 
law most neglected, and that which Llewellyn valued most. In critiquing 
legal formalism, I feel as though Llewellyn must have identified with 
Krazy Kat, pointing to the forever-changing sphere of legal encounters 
while the jail itself remained obstinately and incoherently constant. In 
Coconino County, as Cantor captures, ‘the harsh light transform[s] desert 
rocks into huge cacti, the cacti into tall church spires, split a mesa in the 
background into triplets, turned the triplets into maroon bells for the 
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spires, and left only the Jail ... unchanged, eternally itself, the Pup said, 
like the Law’ (1988: 3). Llewellyn, seeing the pretensions of absolute legal 
formalism, would have shared Herriman’s surreal vision.
Herriman used a union of contractions to unite the law via the 
Surrealist image. Krazy Kat is animated by the interplay of desire and 
law, formalism and realism, the united tension of legal surrealism. The 
Surrealists knew that an image is made compelling by a distant and true 
juxtaposition; legal surrealism posits that the law is made compelling by 
the same dynamic.
Herriman’s exploration of law stretches far beyond the purview of 
this paper, and he entered manifold corners of the law over his three 
decades of publication. I have tried to illuminate what united Krazy 
Kat’s approach, a structure of sensibility I have called legal surrealism. 
It is the foregrounding of the contradictions of law, an approach whereby 
the tension between legal formalism and legal realism are understood as 
constructive. In law, the surrealism is remarkable, the aporia omnipresent, 
but they are typically glossed, putting law out of proportion. Herriman 
knew the humour in restoring those proportions; the lawyer who studies 
Krazy Kat will find the truth in them.
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Notes
1 I wish to thank Desmond Manderson, Luis Gómez Romero, and Mark 
Antaki for their invaluable guidance in this project.
2 When Herriman was asked directly about Krazy’s sex, he replied ‘I don’t 
know. I fooled around with it once; began to think the Kat is a girl – even 
drew up some strips with her pregnant. It wasn’t the Kat anymore. ... Then 
I realized Krazy was something like a sprite, an elf. They have no sex. So 
that Kat can’t be a he or a she. The Kat’s a spirit – a pixie – free to butt into 
anything’ (McDonnell et al 1986: 54).
3 Llewellyn privately published two poetry collections: Beach Plums and Put 
in His Thumb (Hull 1997: 9 n31).
4 Theorists of the Frankfurt School, such as Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer, had recently arrived in America, bringing with them a fierce 
condemnation of every part of the ‘culture industries’ for being, in the words 
of Anthony Chase, ‘baggage of ruling class ideology, a sophisticated barrage 
of loaded imagery which seduced people into a life of mindless consumption 
and diverted them from an authentic confrontation with the way America 
really was’ (1986: 540).
5 Llewellyn ranked eighteenth (Shapiro 2000: 409).
6 Marshal McLuhan even went as far as to suggest that the entire comics 
section in an ‘ordinary newspaper was as frantic as a surrealist art exhibit’ 
(1964: 110).
7 Other observations about the use of Surrealist imagery in Krazy Kat include 
the following: Miles Orvell sees the strip evoking a ‘quaintly surreal two-
dimensional Southwest’ (1995: 132). For Robert Harvey, Herriman created 
‘a surreal landscape of whimsical buttes and cavorting cactuses that changed 
their shapes and move around from panel to panel as his characters capered 
before it, entirely oblivious to the metamorphosis of their background’ (1994: 
177). Charles Johnson limits the moniker surreal only to particular aspects of 
the backdrop – ‘characters performed against a constantly transmogrifying 
background – in the space of two panels, their external world fluidly changed 
from surrealistic mesa and cactuses to forest scenery and seascapes, ever 
blurring the border between appearance and reality’ (1997: xii). Finally, 
Umberto Eco would laud Herriman’s ‘certain surrealistic inventions, 
especially in the improbably lunar landscapes, deliberately intended to divorce 
the events from any verisimilitude’ (1985).
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8 Judith O’Sullivan confines herself to noting that Herriman ‘also utilized 
as mise-en-scène the vacant plain, the animated and constantly changing 
sky, and the protean form’ (1990: 39) before Salvador Dalí popularized 
those aesthetics, but then seems satisfied to move away entirely from the 
question of Surrealism. Rosemont, despite publishing an article titled 
‘Surrealism in the Comics I: Krazy Kat’, only mentions the Surrealists once 
to note Krazy Kat has ‘the flavour ... of the surrealist “one-in-the-other” 
game’ (1987: 124), without further explication. M. Thomas Inge makes an 
admirable attempt to link Krazy Kat to both Dada and Surrealism in his 
‘Krazy Kat as American Dada Art’ (1990), but the title perhaps reveals the 
piece’s limited range – his project is simply to valourize Krazy Kat as a pop 
culture achievement, aesthetically and thematically equal to the Surrealist 
movement’s achievements in so-called high art.
9 The French par la fenêtre contains the same ambiguity as its English 
translation.
10 The three categories are as a descriptive category, as a critical category (which 
this paper pursues), and as a category in the sociology of law (Kennedy 2001: 
8634-8635).
11 Morton Horwitz (1975) has linked the original rise of legal formalism to 
the emergence of a powerful industrial class in America before the Civil 
War. Legal formalism, Horwitz posits, ‘mirrors a convergence of interest 
between the elite of the legal profession and the newly powerful commercial 
and entrepreneurial interests’, the former with the autonomous professional 
interest of establishing law as ‘objective, neutral, and apolitical’, and the 
latter invested in preserving the commercially beneficial legal doctrine that 
had emerged in America by conceptualizing the law ‘not as a malleable 
instrument of their own desires and interests, but as a fixed and inexorable 
system of logically deducible rules’ (1975: 256).
12 Llewellyn would imply these critiques in what N. E. H. Hull calls his ‘classic 
summary’ of legal formalism: ‘The formal style ... set the picture against 
which all modern thinking has played ... that picture is clean and clear: 
the rules of law are to decide the cases; policy is for legislature, not for the 
courts, and so is change even in pure common law. Opinions run in deductive 
form with an air of expression of single line inevitability ... “Principle” is a 
generalization producing order which can and should be used to prune away 
those “anomalous” cases or rules which do not fit, such cases or rules have 
no function except, in places where the supposed “principle” (because, of 
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course, principle was always malleable) does not work well, to accomplish 
sense – but sense is no official concern of a formal-style court’ (1997: 33).
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